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VII
John Adams's
Thoughts on Government

COMMENTARY BY RICHARD B . BERNSTEIN

THE DOCUMENTS EXAMINED HERE are two of the catalysts of the American
experiment with constitutional government in the states. Even before
the Declaration of Independence from Great Britain, Americans set out
to frame new forms of government for themselves, in order to protect
their liberties and to preserve peace and domestic tranquility. These
political experiments gave rise to many of the most important devices
and practices of American constitutionalism.
The framing of new state constitutions grew out of the organization
of American resistance to Great Britain in the 1760s and 1770s. In the
decade following the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, Americans who opposed British colonial policy pieced together a network of committees
of correspondence and public safety. Resistance began with these local
committees, which then named provincial congresses, which in turn
chose delegates to the First and Second Continental Congresses. By
1775, there existed alternative structures of government ready to fill the
vacuum that would be created by the abrogation of British colonial rule.
The process of building revolutionary "shadow governments" was well
under way more than a year before the Continental Congress actually
declared American independence. 1
This commentary is adapted from Richard B. Bernstein with Kym S. Rice, Are I*
to Be a Nation? The Making of the Constitution (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), chapter 3.
1 See, e.g., Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the
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Months before the break with Britain became a legal reality as well
as a practical necessity, Americans realized the need for new, legitimate
sources of governmental authority to replace those soon to be toppled
or swept aside by the Revolution. Because there was as yet no constitutional or legal sanction for an American union~the Continental Congresses being extralegal if not illegal organizations-and because most
American political figures still considered their primary constituencies
to be the individual colonies, this concern with establishing legitimate
government focused on the individual colonies.
In late 1775 and early 1776, the provincial congresses of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia asked the Second
Continental Congress for advice on what to do about the unsettled
condition of government caused by the outbreak of war with Britain.
Congress agreed that there was a crisis of authority, but recommended
only the conven ing of popularly elected assemblies to set up interim
measures for exercising governmental authority to last until the establishment of a reconciliation with Great Britain.
In the congressional debates on these requests, John Adams of
Massachusetts and like-minded colleagues urged Congress to act more
decisively by recommending the establishment of alternative structures
of authority as early as possible before any final break with Britain.
Conservative delegates such as John Dickinson of Pennsylvania and
James Duane and John Jay of New York argued in opposition that
adopting new forms of government would be tantamount to declaring
independence and would prevent reconciliation with the mother country.
It was not until May 10, 1776, that the Second Continental Congress
finally adopted the following resolution drafted by John Adams. Five
days later Congress accepted a preamble to the act also written by
Adams and reprinted below.z
Development of American Opposition to Great Britain, 1763-1776 (New York, 1972); Jack
N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental
Congress (New York, 1979); Jerrilyn Green Marston, King and Congress: The Tra11Sfer of
Political Legitimacy, 177f-1776 (Princeton, 1988); and especially Willi Paul Adams, The
First American Constitutions (Chapel Hill, 1980). Adams's book and Donald S. Lutz,
Popular Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory and the State Constilutio11S (Baton
Rouge, La., 1980), are the best modern studies of the Revolutionary generation's state
constitution-making.
2 The text of this resolution is taken from The New York Public Library's copy of
the official broadside publication, printed in Philadelphia in May 1776 by John Dunlap,
the perennial printer to the Continental and Confederation Congresses. This copy is in
the Library's Rare Books and Manuscripts Division. Spelling and punctuation are as in
the original. Bracketed numbers before each part of the resolution have been inserted
to facilitate reference. On this resolution, see generally Adams, First American Constitutions, 59-62.

120

ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC
IN CONGRESS,
MAY 15, 1776
[1] WHEREAS his Britannic Majesty, in conjunction with the Lords and
Commons of Great-Britain, has, by a late Act of Parliament, excluded
the inhabitants of these United Colonies from the protection of his
crown: [2] And whereas no answer whatever to the humble petition
of the Colonies for redress of grievances, and reconciliation with GreatBritain has been or is likely to be given, but the whole force of that
kingdom, aided by foreign mercenaries, is to be exerted for the destruction of the good people of these Colonies: [3] And whereas it
appears absolutely irreconcileable to reason and good conscience, for
the people of these Colonies now to take the oaths and affirmations
necessary for the support of any government under the Crown of
Great-Britain; and it is necessary that the exercise of every kind of
authority under the said Crown should be totally suppressed, and all
the powers of government exerted under the authority of the people
of the Colonies for the preservation of internal peace, virtue, and good
order, as well as for the defence of their lives, liberties and properties,
against the hostile invasions and cruel depredations of their enemies:
Therefore
RESOLVED, [4] That it be recommended to the respective Assemblies and Conventions of the United Colonies, where no Government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs has been hitherto
established, to adopt such Government as shall in the opinion of the
Representatives of the People best conduce to the happiness and
safety of their Constituents in particular, and America in general.

Extract from the Minutes,
CHARLES THOMSON, SECRETARY
Philadelphia: Printed by JoHN DUNLAP.

A close examination of this resolution enables us to reconstruct the
political and constitutional arguments of the Second Continental Congress. The first numbered clause of the preamble squarely placed the
blame for the rupture between the mother country and the colonies on
George III, acting in concert with the House of Lords and the House
of Commons of the British Parliament. The Act of Parliament mentioned there was the British response to the Olive Branch Petition
adopted by Congress on July 5, 1775-the "humble petition" cited in
the second clause. This petition, adopted at the insistence of delegates
such as Dickinson and Jay, sought (as modern lawyers would say) to
"exhaust the remedies" available to the colonists under the British
constitution by making one last appeal to the King. His refusal of the
petition, and his request that Parliament declare the American colonies
out of his allegiance and protection, made American independence all
but inevitable. The second numbered clause also contained language
(about the "destruction of the good people of these Colonies") recycled
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by Thomas Jefferson into one of the specifications of charges against
George III in both the Declaration of Independence and the preamble
to the Virginia Constitution of 1776. The third numbered clause removed
whatever ambiguity remained about the Americans' attitudes towards
British authority. This part of Adams's preamble evaded the issue of
whether establishing new constitutions would constitute a declaration
of independence, placing the onus of the step on the British. In effect,
the preamble contended, British measures excluding the colonies from
the Crown's protection had compelled the colonists to throw off the
Crown's authority. Adams and his conte~poraries considered this resolution to be the effective instrument of American independence. 3
Read carefully, the fourth numbered clause-the actual resolution
adopted on May 10- did not direct the colonies to adopt republican
governments, but the delegates assumed (and most Americans thought)
that the Revolution was a struggle for republican government under
the principles of the English constitution. Nonetheless, Congress chose
not to recommend or impose a particular form of republican government
or model constitution to be adopted by all the colonies. The delegates
agreed that the people of each colony should adopt a form of government
best suited to their needs, local conditions, and ideas of what a government should be. The Americans believed, as did most educated and
politically active men of their time, that there was an intimate connection between a people's values and habits, on the one hand, and their
institutions of government and systems of law, on the other. 4
Congress's decision not to prescribe a model constitution for the
colonies did not prevent individual delegates from writing constitutions
or making recommendations. For example, in May and June of 1776,
Thomas Jefferson drafted a constitution for Virginia and sent it home
with his mentor George Wythe, only to discover that the Virginia convention of 1776 had anticipated him; however, as pointed out by Donald
S. Lutz in his commentary in this volume, the convention grafted Jefferson's preamble, with its vigorous denunciation of George III (later
incorporated into the Declaration of Independence), onto its own version as a statement of the justification for adopting a new constitution.
Constitution-making engrossed delegates to Congress and their colleagues back home. Some delegates to Congress even began to complain
about the lack of attention to the exigencies of the Revolution resulting
from their fellow delegates' obsession with constitution-making.5
Adams, First American Constitutions, 61.
Adams, First American Constitutions, 49-62.
s On the fever of constitution-making, see George Dargo, Law in the New Republic:
Private Law and the Public Estate (New York, 1983), 10; Adams, First American Consti3
4
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The Americans' emphasis on written constitutions was rooted in
American colonial history and the circumstances of the Revolution. 6
The term constitution in English usage denoted the whole complex of
laws, common-law rules, customs, usages, and traditions that shape the
political relations, rights, and responsibilities of the polity and its members. As part of the founding of colonies in North America, the Crown
granted-or the colonists wrote-colonial charters setting forth the
guidelines under which political power would be exercised; these new
societies were at the same time extensions of England and distinct
political communities with their own concerns and unique local conditions. Disputes between the colonists and representatives of the
Crown over the extent of Crown authority and colonial self-government
often focused on these written instruments of government; this mode
of constitutional and political argument was still fresh in American
memories at the outbreak of the constitutional crisis of the 1760s and
1770s. With the drift toward independence, the Americans again recognized the need to specify the basis for their new, independent political
organizations in written instruments of government. This perceived necessity accorded with their sense that principles of government were
immutable laws of nature, and thus had to be fixed in writing in a form
distinct from and superior to mere statutes; by contrast, the unwritten
English constitution, subject to the shifts and convulsions of ordinary
politics, was not a sufficient bulwark against oppression. 7
Of all the advice and suggestions produced for writing constitutions
in the early years of the Revolution, perhaps the most important and
influential was John Adams's Thoughts on Government. 8 Adams long had
tutio11s, 49-98; Allan Nevins, The America11 States Duri11g a11d After the Revolutio11, 17761789 (New York, 1924), 117-70. See also, Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States,
1775-1783 (New York, 1973), a useful supplement to Nevins. The manuscript of the third
draft of Jefferson's constitution is in the Rare Books and Manuscripts Division, The New
York Public Library; it is reprinted, with annotations and commentary, in Julian P. Boyd,
Charles T. Cullen, and John Catanzariti, eds., The Papers of Thomas Jejferso11, 21 vols. to
date (Princeton, 1950-), I: 356-65; the first two drafts are reprinted in ibid., 329-86.
On the idea of a written constitution see Dargo, law i11 the New Republic, 13-17; on the
colonial heritage of written charters see also George Dargo, Roots of the Republic: A New
Perspective 011 Early America11 Comtitutionalism (New York, 1974), chap. 3. See also the
works by Lutz cited below in note 6.
6 On this, see Donald S. Lutz's fine monographs, Popular Co11sent a11d Popular
Control, already cited, and The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge, La.,
1988).

See notes 6 and 7 above.
On this pamphlet, the first of Adams's great writings on American constitutionalism (his newspaper and pamphlet writings on the constitutional controversy with Great
Britain are contributions to British constitutional thought), see generally John R. Howe,
7

8
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been fascinated by the intricacies of constitutional issues and had acquired a reputation for his extensive study of the subject. The story of
the composition of Thoughts on Government illustrates the Americans'
tendency to seize upon practical political crises as occasions to articulate
their theoretical assumptions and arguments on constitutional questions.
In November of 1775, congressional delegate Richard Henry Lee
of Virginia asked his fellow delegate John Adams for his thoughts on
the structures of government that Americans should adopt if a break
with Great Britain should occur, and Adams penned a brief sketch of
what a new constitution should contain. In March 1776, two North
Carolina delegates to Congress, John Penn and William Hooper, also
approached Adams for advice when they received instruction to return
home to help draft that state's constitution. Adams described his response in a letter to his friend and close political ally James Warren: 9
The Time was very Short. However the Gentleman thinking it an
opportunity, providentially thrown in his Way, of communicating Some
Hints upon a subject, which seems not to have been sufficiently considered in the southern Colonies, and so of turning the Thought of
Gentlemen that way, concluded to borrow a little Time from his sleep
and accordingly wrote with his own Hand, a Sketch, which he copied,
giving the original to Mr. Hooper and the copy to Mr. Penn, which
they carried with them to Carolina.
Adams's "Sketch" attracted more attention from his colleagues in
Congress than he had expected. The respected lawyer and jurist George
Wythe of Virginia caught sight of either Penn's or Hooper's copy, and
Adams obligingly wrote out another version at Wythe's request. Then
Jonathan Dickinson Sargeant of New Jersey asked for a copy. Adams
prepared a revised and expanded version (now lost) for Sargeant. When
Richard Henry Lee, who had received the earliest articulation of Adams's thinking, asked for a copy of his March 1776 letter, Adams borrowed back Wythe's copy and authorized Lee to arrange for its publication as an anonymous pamphlet, perhaps to stimulate his fellow
Jr., The Changing Political Thought of John Adams (Princeton, 1966), 59-rn1; Peter Shaw,
The Character ofJohn Adams (Chapel Hill, 1976), 92-97; Timothy H. Breen, "John Adams'
Fight against Innovation in the New England Constitution: 1776," New England Quarterly
40 (1967): 501-20; Adams, First American Constitutions, 121-24. See also the account in
L. H. Butterfield, ed., The Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, 4 vols. (Cambridge,
Mass., 1961), 3: 331-32.
9 John Adams to James Warren, April 20, 1776, in Robert J. Taylor et al., eds.,
Papers of John Adams, 8 vols. to date (Cambridge, Mass., 1977-), 4: 130-32 {quote at
131).
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delegates' consideration of the resolution they finally passed the next
month. 10 Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present State of the
American Colonies. In a Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend appeared
in Philadelphia in late April of 1776 and was published several months
later in Boston. 11
Adams declared that his "Design [in Thoughts on Government] is to
mark out a Path, and putt Men upon thinking." 12 In part he wrote his
pamphlet in opposition to Thomas Paine's Common Sense, published in
January 1776. Paine's first order of business was to invoke the republican
sentiments of the American colonists to encourage resistance to British
authority, but he also sketched his idea of the proper mode of government to replace the British colonial system. Paine suggested the creation
of unicameral legislatures for each of the colonies, to be subordinate
to a unicameral continental congress. Neither level of government
would have an independent executive. Paine discarded separation of
powers and checks and balances as important principles of republican
government; he believed that the legislature, representing the whole
people, should exercise all functions of government. Because there was
no need to check the voice of the people by creating a second or upper
house, Paine said, legislatures should be unicameral.
Adams and other moderate Revolutionary leaders valued Common
Sense for its vigorous arguments against British rule, but they disliked
Paine's radical plan for organizing governments. In contrast to Paine,
Adams maintained that the new governments should preserve the best
of the Anglo-American traditions of government-especially the idea of
separation of powers. Thoughts on Government thus represents the moderate brand of Revolutionary constitutionalism. 13
Like Paine, Adams scoffed at Alexander Pope's lines in An Essay
on Man: 14
10 In a prefatory note written in 1811, Adams explained that he had decided to keep
his name off the pamphlet because "if [my name] should appear, it would excite a
continental clamor among the tories, that I was erecting a battering-ram to demolish
the royal government and render independence indispensable." Charles Francis Adams,
ed., The life and Works of John Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, 1850-56), 4: 189.
11 The history of the drafting and publication of Thoughts on Government receives
its most detailed analysis in Taylor et al., Papers of John Adams, 4: 65-73.
12 John Adams to James Warren, April 20, 1776, in Taylor et al., Papers of John
Adams, 4: 132.
13 This paragraph and the one preceding is indebted co Willi Paul Adams's suggestive juxtaposition of Common Sense with Thoughts on Government in Adams, First American
Constitutions, 121-24. The phrase "revolutionary constitutionalism" comes from the short
but valuable discussion in Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred Harbison, and Herman Belz, The
American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 6th ed. (New York, 1983), 68-85.
14 Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, Epistle III, lines 303-04.
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For forms of government let fools contest,
That which is best administered is best.
He declared:
Nothing can be more fallacious than this: But poets read history to
collect flowers not fruits-they attend to fanciful images, not the effects
of social institutions. Nothing is more certain from the history of
nations, and the nature of man, than that some forms of government
are better fitted for being well administered than others.
Adams argued that only a republic could achieve the proper end
of government-the promotion of human happiness, which he equated
with virtue, the guiding principle of a republic. But determining the
best form of a republic is just as important as choosing to create a
republic in the first place. Adams thus rejected Paine's reliance on a
one-house legislature as the sole institution of government in a republic.
Noting the many faults of constructing a republican government consisting of a single assembly, Adams cited three as particular threats to
republicanism: (1) A single assembly is susceptible to "all the vices,
follies and frailties of an individual." (2) A single assembly cannot
exercise the executive power "for want of two essential properties,
secrecy and dispatch." (3) It cannot exercise the judicial power because
it has too many members, works too slowly, and is "too little skilled
in the laws." Developing these points he added that it was unsound to
lodge only the power of legislation in a unicameral assembly, for the
conflicts between a unitary executive and a unicameral assembly would
destroy a republic. The judiciary could not act as a referee between
the executive and legislature, because it was under the control of the
legislature. Thus, a second house of the legislature was needed to act
as mediator between the executive and the lower house in the process
of legislation-incidentally, replicating the structure of King, Lords, and
Commons familiar to generations of English lawyers, politicians, and
voters.
Adams suggested establishing a representative assembly, which
would elect a council (his term for the upper house, derived from the
colonial charters' structure of governor, council, and assembly); both
houses would then elect a governor. The governor would be armed with
an absolute veto over legislation and would have the power to appoint
"Judges, Justices and all other officers, civil and military" with the
consent of the council. To preserve their independence, judges would
have tenure for life during good behavior, breaches of which would be
punished by impeachment and removal from office. Adams recom-
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mended that the governor and all members of both houses of the legislature be elected annually; this limitation "will teach them the great
political virtues of humility, patience, and moderation, without which
every man in power becomes a ravenous beast of prey." Finally, Adams
proposed areas in which the new government should legislate-including
public education, the militia, and sumptuary laws (such laws, first enacted in ancient Rome, were designed to tax what we would call conspicuous consumption to guard against the diseases of luxury and corruption, as well as to generate revenue for the government).
Adams reminded his readers that they should not hesitate to rework
their new constitutions should actual practice reveal defects in the design; he suggested such reforms as replacing annual elections with
longer terms of office, electing the governor and council by popular
vote, and giving both houses of the legislature a say in appointing judges
and other officers of government. Nonetheless, he predicted that the
government whose outlines he set forth in Thoughts on Government
would confirm the people in their attachment to republican government
and improve them in their daily lives as well.
It is difficult to estimate the influence that Thoughts on Government
had on the first state constitutions. Adams had intended his pamphlet
to spur constitution-making in the southern states in the direction of
republicanism in the hope that they would adopt governments as democratic as those of New England. But Thoughts on Government found
readers beyond Adams's intended southern audience as well. In his
home state, it was frequently quoted in newspaper essays throughout
Massachusetts and even reprinted once in the Newburyport Essex Journal. Adams's friend Benjamin Rush drew extensively on Thoughts on
Government in his attacks on the radical, Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776 with its unicameral assembly; and that document's defenders also
quoted Adams to refute Rush's invocation of his authority. Several of
the state constitutions framed after Adams wrote were consistent with
his prescription, and his friends and colleagues in Virginia, North Carolina, New Jersey, and New York assured him that they had made good
use of his advice-assurances which later scholars have confirmed. 15 The
constitutions of all these states established bicameral legislatures and
executives headed by a single governor, although most of these governors were weak and dependent on the legislature; Adams's belief in
an independent executive as an essential element of republican checks
and balances ran counter to the prevailing American distrust of executive power.
ts See the valuable discussion in Taylor et al., Papers of Joh11 Adams, 4: 69-73.
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Adams's pamphlet was widely and respectfully read and studied,
even by his political and intellectual opponents. It helped to crystallize
what many of Adams's fellow constitution-makers believed. Moreover,
when Adams got the chance to prepare the draft of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, he followed many of the prescriptions set forth in
his 1776 pamphlet; in turn, many of the provisions of that document
shaped by the recommendations of Thoughts on Government helped to
shape the framing of the United States Constitution in 1787. 16 Finally,
Adams's statement in that pamphlet of the intellectual challenge and
excitement of constitution-making stands as an eloquent summary of
the spirit of the age:
You and I, my dear Friend, have been sent into life, at a time when
the greatest law-givers of antiquity would have wished to have lived .
How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of
making an election of government more than of air, soil, or climate,
for themselves or their children. When! Before the present epocha,
had three millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form
and establish the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom
can contrive?

In the 1990s, an era in which the nations of Eastern Europe are
engaged in drafting or revising their constitutions and when the nations
of Europe hope to create by 1992 a European confederation on a scale
unprecedented in human history, the pages of Thoughts on Government
have renewed relevance.

For Further Reading
Willi Paul Adams. The First American Constitutions. Chapel Hill, 1980.
Timothy H . Breen. "John Adams' Fight against Innovation in the New
England Constitution: 1776." New England Quarterly 40. 1967.
L. H. Butterfield, ed. The Diary a11d Autobiography of Joh11 Adams, 4 vols.
Cambridge, Mass., 1961.
John R. Howe, Jr. The Changi11g Political Thought of Joh11 Adams. Princeton, 1966.
Donald S. Lutz. Popular Conse11t and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory and the State Constitutio11s. Baton Rouge, La., 1980.
16 On the pamphlet's influence on the framing of the Massachusetts constitution
of 1780, see Taylor et al., Papers of John Adams, 4: 71-72 .
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Pauline Maier. From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the
Development of American Opposition to the Great Britain, 1763-1776.
New York, 1972.
Jerrilyn Green Marston. King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776. Princeton, 1988.
Jack N. Rakove. The Beginnings ofNational Politics: An Interpretive History
of the Continental Congress. New York, 1979.
Peter Shaw. The Character of John Adams. Chapel Hill, 1976.

[John Adams's
Thoughts on Government]

My dear Sir,
If I was equal to the task of forming a plan for the government of
a colony, I should be flattered with your request, and very happy to
comply with it; because as the divine science of politicks is the science
of social happiness, and the blessings of society depend entirely on the
constitutions of government, which are generally institutions that last
for many generations, there can be no employment more agreeable to
a benevolent mind, than a research after the best. PoPE flattered tyrants
too much when he said,
"For forms of government let fools contest,
That which is best administered is best. " 1
Nothing can be more fallacious than this: But poets read history to
collect flowers not fruits-they attend to fanciful images, not the effects
of social institutions. Nothing is more certain from the history of nations,
and the nature of man, than that some forms of government are better
fitted for being well administered than others.
WE ought to consider, what is the end of government, before we
determine which is the best form.-Upon this point all speculative politicians will agree, that the happiness of society is the end of government,
as all Divines and moral Philosophers will agree that the happiness of
the individual is the end of man. From this principle it will follow, that
the form of government, which communicates ease, comfort, security,
The full title of the text is Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present State
of the American Colonies. In a Letter from a Gentleman to his Frimd and is taken from
Robert J. Taylor et al., eds., Papers of John Adams, 8 vols. to date (Cambridge, Mass.,
1977-), 4: 86-93, which in turn is based on the Boston reprint of the first pamphlet
edition published in Philadelphia in 1776 by John Dunlap.
1 As noted in the commentary above, this verse comes from Alexander Pope, An
Essay 011 Ma11, Epistle III, lines 303-04. Note that Alexander Hamilton also quoted these
lines to criticize them in The Federalist No. 68, but then qualified his criticism by pointing
out that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a
good administration, a point presaged by Adams at the close of this first paragraph.
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or in one word happiness to the greatest number of persons, and in the
greatest degree, is the best. 2
ALL sober enquiries after truth, ancient and modern, Pagan and
Christian, have declared that the happiness of man, as well as his dignity
consists in virtue. Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, Mahomet, not to mention authorities really sacred, have agreed in this.
IF there is a form of government then, whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not every sober man acknowledge it better calculated to promote the general happiness than any other form?
FEAR is the foundation of most governments; but is so sordid and
brutal a passion, and renders men, in whose breasts it predominates,
so stupid, and miserable, that Americans will not be likely to approve
of any political institution which is founded on it.
HoNOUR is truly sacred, But holds a lower rank in the scale of moral
excellence than virtue.-lndeed the former is but a part of the latter,
and consequently has not equal pretensions to support a frame of government productive of human happiness.
THE foundation of every government is some principle or passion
in the minds of the people.-The noblest principles and most generous
affections in our nature then, have the fairest chance to support the
noblest and most generous models of government.
A MAN must be indifferent to the sneers of modern Englishmen to
mention in their company, the names of Sidney, Harrington, Locke,
Milton, Nedham, Neville, Burnet, and Hoadley.3 -No small fortitude
2 Compare this paragraph's discussion of the greatest happiness to the greatest
degree for the greatest number as the end of government with Jeremy Bentham's 1776
Fragmmt on Gouemment and his lntroductio11 to the Pri11ciples of Morals and Legislatio11.
3 The historical figures cited here by Adams are all heroes of the seventeenthcentury English struggles against the tyranny, real or feared, of the Stuart kings. They
include the martyr Algernon Sidney (1622-1683), executed by the government of Charles
II for the manuscript of his posthumously published Discourses concerning Gouemment,
John Harrington (1611-1677), whose utopian work Oceana was a landmark in the history
of English republican thought; John Locke (1634- 1704), the renowned author of the
Essay Concerning Human Understanding and the Two Treatises of Gouemme11t, Marchamont
Nedham (1620-1678), whose The Excellmcie of a Free State and other works on republican
government John Adams reviewed and commented on in his three-volume A Deje11ce of
the Constitutions of Gouemment of the United States (1787-1788); Henry Neville (16201694) , a contemporary and intellectual ally of Harrington, and the author of Plato Rediuiuus; the prominent Whig historian and bishop of Salisbury Gilbert Burnet (16431715), who preached the coronation sermon at the coronation of William and Mary in
1689; and Benjamin Hoadly (1675- 1761), bishop of Bangor, Hereford, Salisbury, and
Winchester, and another noted Whig controversialist. The best study of these figures
and their intellectual and political context is Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century
Commo11wealthman: Studies in the Tra11smissio11, Development and Circumstance of E11glish
Liberal Thought from the Restoratio11 of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colo11ies
(Cambridge, Mass., 1959; paperback, with new preface, New York, 1968) .
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is necessary to confess that one has read them. The wretched condition
of this country, however, for ten or fifteen years past, has frequently
reminded me of their principles and reasonings. They will convince any
candid mind, that there is no good government but what is Republican.
That the only valuable part of the British constitution is so; because
the very definition of a Republic, is "an Empire of Laws, and not of
men. " 4 That, as a Republic is the best of governments, so that particular
arrangement of the powers of society, or in other words that form of
government, which is best contrived to secure an impartial and exact
execution of the laws, is the best of Republics.
OF Republics, there is an inexhaustible variety, because the possible
combinations of the powers of society, are capable of innumerable variations. 5
As good government, is an empire of laws, how shall your laws be
made? In a large society, inhabiting an extensive country, it is impossible
that the whole should assemble, to make laws: The first necessary step
then, is, to depute power from the many, to a few of the most wise and
good.-But by what rules shall you choose your Representatives? .Agree
upon the number and qualifications of persons, who shall have the
benefit of choosing, or annex this privilege to the inhabitants of a certain
extent of ground.
THE principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be employed in constituting this Representative Assembly. It should be in
miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. 6 It should think,
feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the interest of this
Assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an equal representation, or in other words equal interest among the people should
have equal interest in it.-Great care should be taken to effect this, and
to prevent unfair, partial, and corrupt elections. Such regulations, however, may be better made in times of greater tranquility than the present,
and they will spring up of themselves naturally, when all the powers
4 Compare Article XXX of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which enshrined che principle of separation of powers "to the end it
may be a government of laws and not of men." See the commentary by Richard B.
Bernstein on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 in chis volume.
5 For a modern discussion of the varying types of republi canism and the varying
forms of government that can be deduced from chis range of republican principles, see
Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorom: The /nte/lect11al Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, Kans ., 1985), 66-87.
6 Note Adams's insistence chat the representative assembly "be in miniature, an
exact portrait of the people ac large." On theories of representation, see generally Hanna
Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley, 1967), and John Phillip Reid,
The Concept of Represmtation in the Age of the American Revolution (Chicago, 1988).
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of government come to be in the hands of the peoples friends. At present
it will be safest to proceed in all esta.blished modes to which the people
have been familiarised by habit.
A REPRESENTATION of the people in one assembly being obtained,
a question arises whether all the powers of government, legislative,
executive, and judicial, shall be left in this body? I think a people cannot
be long free, nor ever happy, whose government is in one Assembly. 7
My reasons for this opinion are as follow.
1. A SINGLE Assembly is liable to all the vices, follies and frailties
of an individual.- Subject to fits of humour, starts of passion, flights of
enthusiasm, partialities of prejudice, and consequently productive of
hasty results and absurd judgments: And all these errors ought to be
corrected and defects supplied by some controuling power.
2 . A SINGLE Assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time will not
scruple to exempt itself from burthens which it will lay, without compunction, on its constituents.
3. A SINGLE Assembly is apt to grow ambitious, and after a time
will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual. Th'is was one fault of the long
parliament, but more remarkably of Holland, whose Assembly first
voted themselves from annual to septennial, then for life, and after a
course of years, that all vacancies happening by death, or otherwise,
should be filled by themselves, without any application to constituents
at all.
4. A REPRESENTATIVE Assembly, altho' extremely well qualified, and
absolutely necessary as a branch of the legislature, is unfit to exercise
the executive power, for want of two essential properties, secrecy and
dispatch. 8
5. A REPRESENTATIVE Assembly is still less qualified for the judicial
power; because it is too numerous, too slow, and too little skilled in
the laws.9
7

Compare the comment of Thomas Jefferson on the Virginia Constitution of 1776:

All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to
the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely
the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these
powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. 173
despots will surely be as oppressive as one.
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, edited by William Peden (Chapel Hill,
1955) , Query XIII, 120. This passage from Jefferson was quoted by James Mad ison in
The Federalist No. 48.
B On the qualities of secrecy and dispatch as characteristic of a good executive, see
also Alexander Hamilton's discussion in The Federalist No. 70 and the commentary by
Richard B. Bernstein on The Federalist Nos. 15, 70, and 78 in this volume.
9 On the qualities needed for a good judiciary, see also Alexander Hamilton's
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6. BECAUSE a single Assembly, possessed of all the powers of government, would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all
laws arbitrarily for their own interest, and adjudge all controversies in
their own favour.
BuT shall the whole power of legislation rest in one Assembly? Most
of the foregoing reasons apply equally to prove that the legislative power
ought to be more complex-to which we may add, that if the legislative
power is wholly in one Assembly, and the executive in another, or in
a single person, these two powers will oppose and enervate upon each
other, until the contest shall end in war, and the whole power, legislative
and executive, be usurped by the strongest.
THE judicial power, in such case, could not mediate, or hold the
balance between the two contending powers, because the legislative
would undermine it. 10-And this shews the necessity too, of giving the
executive power a negative upon the legislative, otherwise this will be
continually encroaching upon that.
To avoid these dangers let a distant 11 Assembly be constituted, as
a mediator between the two extreme branches of the legislature, that
which represents the people and that which is vested with the executive
power.
LET the Representative Assembly then elect by ballot, from among
themselves or their constituents, or both, a distinct Assembly, which
for the sake of perspicuity we will call a Council. It may consist of any
number you please, say twenty or thirty, and should have a free and
independent exercise of its judgment, and consequently a negative voice
in the legislature.
THESE two bodies thus constituted, and made integral parts of the
legislature, let them unite, and by joint ballot choose a Governor, who,
after being stripped of most of those badges of domination called prerogatives, should have a free and independent exercise of his judgment,
and be made also an integral part of the legislature. This I know is
liable to objections, and if you please you may make him only President
discussion in The Federalist No. 78 and the commentary by Richard B. Bernstein on The
Federalist Nos. 15, 70, and 78 in this volume.
1
Compare Adams's ideas about the judiciary with Hamilton's in The Federalist No.
78, and see the commentary by Richard B. Bernstein on The Federalist Nos. 15, 70, and
78 in this volume. Ideas of separation of powers and checks and balances changed greatly
between 1776 and 1787, according to Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, 1969).
11 The editors of the Papers of Jo/Jn Adams suggest that this word should be " direct"
rather than "distant."
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of the Council, as in Connecticut: 12 But as the Governor is to be invested
with the executive power, with consent of Council, I think he ought to
have a negative upon the legislative. If he is annually elective, as he
ought to be, he will always have so much reverence and affection for
the People, their Representatives and Councillors, that although you
give him an independent exercise of his judgment, he will seldom use
it in opposition to the two Houses, except in cases the public utility of
which would be conspicuous, and some such cases would happen.
IN the present exigency of American affairs, when by an act of
Parliament we are put out of the royal protection, and consequently
discharged from our allegiance; and it has become necessary to assume
government for our immediate security, the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary, Treasurer, Commissary, Attorney-General, should be
chosen by joint ballot, of both Houses. And these and all other elections,
especially of Representatives and Councillors, should be annual, there
not being in the whole circle of the sciences, a maxim more infallible
than this, "Where annual elections end, there slavery begins."
THESE great men, in this respect, should be, once a year
"Like bubbles on the sea of matter borne,
They rise, they break, and to that sea return." 13
This will teach them the great political virtues of humility, patience,
and moderation, without which every man in power becomes a ravenous
beast of prey.
THIS mode of constituting the great offices of state will answer very
well for the present, but if, by experiment, it should be found inconvenient, the legislature may at its leisure devise other methods of creating them, by elections of the people at large, as in Connecticut, or
it may enlarge the term for which they shall be chosen to seven years,
or three years, or for life, or make any other alterations which the society
shall find productive of its ease, its safety, its freedom, or in one word,
its happiness.
A ROTATION of all offices, as well as of Representatives and Councillors, has many advocates, and is contended for with many plausible
arguments. It would be attended no doubt with many advantages, and
iz Adams referred here to the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut of 1639, which,
revised slightly in 1776, served as the constitution of the state until 1818. See the commentary on the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut by Donald S. Lutz in this volume
(Chapter 2 above).
13 These lines come from Alexander Pope, A11 fuo·ay 011 Ma11, Epistle III, lines 1920. As made clear in the text, Adams cited Pope to illustrate and support the principle
of rotation in office.
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if the society has a sufficient number of suitable characters to supply
the great number of vacancies which would be made by such a rotation,
I can see no objection to it. These persons may be allowed to serve for
three years, and then be excluded three years, or for any longer or
shorter term.
ANY seven or nine of the legislative Council may be made a Quorum,
for doing business as a Privy Council, to advise the Governor in the
exercise of the executive branch of power, and in all acts of state.
THE GovERNOR should have the command of the militia, and of all
your armies. The power of pardons should be with the Governor and
Council.
JUDGES, Justices and ·all other officers, civil and military, should be
nominated and appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent
of Council, unless you choose to have a government more popular; if
you do, all officers, civil and military, may be chosen by joint ballot of
both Houses, or in order to preserve the independence and importance
of each House, by ballot of one House, concurred by the other. Sheriffs
should be chosen by the freeholders of counties-so should Registers
of Deeds and Clerks of Counties.
ALL officers should have commissions, under the hand of the Governor and seal of the Colony.
THE dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the
morals of the people and every blessing of society, depends so much
upon an upright and skillful administration of justice, that the judicial
power ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive, and
independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon both, as both
should be checks upon that. The Judges therefore should always be
men of learning and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great
patience, calmness, coolness and attention. Their minds should not be
distracted with jarring interests; they should not be dependent upon
any man, or body of men. To these ends they should hold estates for
life in their offices, or in other words their commissions should be during
good behaviour, and their salaries ascertained and established by law. 14
For misbehaviour the grand inquest of the Colony, the House of Representatives, should impeach them before the Governor and Council,
where they should have time and opportunity to make their defence,
but if convicted should be removed from their offices, and subjected to
such other punishment as shall be thought proper.
14
Compare Adams's discussion of judicial power with Alexander Hamilton's fuller
and more elaborate analysis in The Federalist Nos. 78-83, and see Richard B. Bernstein's
commentary on The Federalist Nos. 15, 70, and 78 in this volume.
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A MILITIA LAW requmng all men, or with very few exceptions,
besides cases of conscience, to be provided with arms and ammunition,
to be trained at certain seasons, and requiring counties, towns, or other
small districts to be provided with public stocks of ammunition and
entrenching utensils, and with some settled plans for transporting provisions after the militia, when marched to defend their country against
sudden invasions, and requiring certain districts to be provided with
field pieces, companies of matrosses, and perhaps some regiments of
light horse, is always a wise institution, and in the present circumstances
of our country indispensible. 15
LAws for the liberal education of youth, especially of the lower class
of people, are so extremely wise and useful, that to a humane and
generous mind, no expence for this purpose would be thought extravagant.16
THE very mention of sumptuary laws will excite a smile. Whether
our countrymen have wisdom and virtue enough to submit to them I
know not. But the happiness of the people might be greatly promoted
by them, and a revenue saved sufficient to carry on this war forever.
Frugality is a great revenue, besides curing us of vanities, levities and
fopperies which are real antidotes to all great, manly and warlike virtues.
BuT must not all commissions run in the name of a King? No. Why
may they not as well run thus, "The Colony of
to A. B. greeting,"
and be tested by the Governor?
WHY may not writs, instead of running in the name of a King, run
thus, "The Colony of
to the Sheriff," &c. and be tested by the Chief
Justice.
WHY may not indictments conclude, "against the peace of the Colony of
and the dignity of the same?"
A CONSTITUTION, founded on these principles, introduces knowledge among the People, and inspires them with a conscious dignity,
becoming Freemen. A general emulation takes place, which causes good
humour, sociability, good manners, and good morals to be general. That
elevation of sentiment, inspired by such a government, makes the common people brave and enterprizing. That ambition which is inspired
by it makes them sober, industrious and frugal. You will find among
them some elegance, perhaps, but more solidity; a little pleasure, but
is This passage casts interesting light on the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution. See John P. Kaminski and Richard B. Bernstein's commentary on
the Bill of Rights in this volume in Chapter 18 below.
16 On governmental responsibility for education, compare Chapter V of the frame
of government of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, and see Richard B. Bernstein's
commentary on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 in Chapter 11 below.
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a great deal of business-some politeness, but more civility. If you
compare such a country with the regions of domination, whether Monarchial or Aristocratical, you will fancy yourself in Arcadia or Elisium.
IF the Colonies should assume governments separately, they should
be left entirely to their own choice of the forms, and if a Continental
Constitution should be formed, it should be a Congress, containing a
fair and adequate Representation of the Colonies, and its authority
should sacredly be confined to these cases, viz. war, trade, disputes
between Colony and Colony, the Post-Office, and the unappropriated
lands of the Crown, as they used to be called. 17
THESE Colonies, under such forms of government, and in such a
union, would be unconquerable by all the Monarchies of Europe.
You and I, my dear Friend, have been sent into life, at a time when
the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to have lived.How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making
an election of government more than of air, soil, or climate, for themselves or their children.-When! Before the present epocha, had three
millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish
the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can contrive?
I hope you will avail yourself and your country of that extensive learning
and indefatigable industry which you possess, to assist her in the formations of the happiest governments, and the best character of a great
People.-For myself, I must beg you to keep my name out of sight, for
this feeble attempt, if it should be known to be mine, would oblige me
to apply to myself those lines of the immortal John Milton, in one of
his sonnets,
"I did but teach the age to quit their cloggs
By the plain rules of ancient Liberty,
When Io! a barbarous noise surrounded me,
Of owls and cuckoos, asses, apes and dogs." 18

11 Note the limited purposes for which Adams suggested the necessity of a "Continental Constitution." A person holding such views eleven years later, in 1787, would
be an Antifederalist. Note, however, Adams's willingness to assign authority over the
"unappropriated lands of the Crown, as they used to be called," to the Congress. See,
on this point, the commentary on the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 by Peter S. Onuf
in Chapter 13 of volume.
18 These lines are slightly misquoted from John Milton, "On the Detraction Which
Followed upon My Writing Certain Treatises," second part, "On the Same," lines 14. They exhibit John Adams's concern, a constant throughout his life but especially in
the difficult months before the declaration of American independence in July 1776, that
his countrymen were ready to scorn him rather than listen to him.

